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STATINTL

Clemens: Red kudos, Western bonus

tion the fact that a Russian defector, Anatoli Dolnytsin, is in this country and is providing important intelligence information. Apart from national security it is essential no details should be published about Dolnytsin because of positive danger to his own life." Until then, only a handful had known about the case, even fewer about the defector's name. Now, hundreds became privy to the story. It was like trying to keep a secret by shouting it from the rooftops.

Actually, Dolnytsin had gone over to the U.S. first—about eighteen months ago. CIA and MI5 had milked him dry, plastic surgeons gave him a new face, and he is now living in Britain. According to Western intelligence sources, Dolnytsin was the biggest catch since Vladimir Petrov, a Soviet MVD boss who defected in Australia nine years ago. And his disclosures have already forced a complete overhaul of Soviet intelligence operations.

**Costly Baby:** If the British were jubilant, the West Germans were glum. On trial last week in Karlsruhe were three agents of the widely acclaimed Federal Intelligence Agency (Bonn's CIA) charged with spying for the Soviet Union. Commonly known as the "Gehlen organization" (its head is Reinhard Gehlen, a former Nazi intelligence officer who served on the Eastern front), the agency had been the "postwar baby" of the U.S. As Gehlen and his men were experts on Russia, the U.S. funded his organization until 1955 when West Germany regained its full sovereignty.

At the trial it was revealed that the three double agents, Heinz Loh, Hans Clemens, and Erwin Tichel had been

employed by Moscow as counterspies for more than ten years during which time they had transmitted to the Russians 15,000 photographs of Gehlen's files, twenty tape recordings, and had held at least twenty personal meetings with high Soviet intelligence officials. The key man was Felde (a former SS official) who in Gehlen's organization had become division chief for the Soviet section. He gave the Russians information about Gehlen's network of spies operating in Communist countries.

The work of the defendants was so successful (though Felde claimed he only garnered \$28,750 from the Russians) that Felde and Clemens at one time simultaneously received a message of commendation from Alexander N. Shelepin, chairman of the Soviet Committee of State Security, along with a plaque and a cash bonus from Gehlen for ten years of meritorious service.

As a result of the proceedings, there were indications, that the Germans, like the Russians, would also have to overhaul their intelligence organizations. Adding insult to injury was an embarrassing statement by one of the accused: "The Russians once asked me to seek a transfer because there was a surplus of Soviet agents in my department."

## ESPIONAGE:

**'D' for Dolnytsin**

"The life of spies is to know, not to be known," goes a seventeenth-century proverb. But in recent weeks, the age-old adage hasn't held true with an epidemic of "known" spies—Soviet agents, Western agents, and double agents. In a jocular aside to ex-CIA chief Allen Dulles, Nikita Khrushchev once said: "It's about time we stopped paying two salaries to spies working for both of us."

Britain, long plagued by its own spate of sex and spy scandals, was in a heady mood and breathed a sigh of relief last week as its newspapers splashed what they thought was a brand-new spy story: this time the defection of one Anatoli Dolnytsin, a top Soviet intelligence officer. The British Government, anxious to keep the latest espionage installment under a tight security wrap, could actually take credit for breaking the story—through sheer ineptitude.

Authorities put out what is known in press circles as a "D" notice—i.e., a request not to publish something in the interest of national security. Even the Communist Daily Worker got one. "You are earnestly requested . . . not to men-